

# Evolution of the Password

*Dr Philip O'Kane*

Lecturer at Queen's University Belfast  
MSc Applied Cybersecurity Director

# The Evolution of Password

- The Evolution of Password as a means of authentication
- What is:
  - Authentication
  - Authorization
- Password
  - A little history of passwords
  - Password usage
  - Password storage
  - Human behaviour
  - Targeting the weakness link – humans & passwords


# Authentication

- Authentication enables organizations to secure their system by permitting only authenticated users or processes to access protected resources.
- Authentication is a process of determining:
  - Who someone is
  - What something is

OR

  - Who or what they declare themselves to be

# Authentication




- Authentication is validating credentials such as:
  - Who they are
  - What they know
  - What they have

# Authentication

- Identify someone
  - Something they know – password or pin

qwerty  
password1

- Something they have – mobile phone (one time password)



- Something they are – Turing test




# Authentication

- Single-Factor
  - Username/User ID and password to verify their identity.
- Two-Factor (2FA)
  - Using a combination of two factors
    - Something they know = PIN, password
    - Something they have = bank card, mobile phone (text) **One time password**
- Multi-Factor (MFA)
  - Uses multiple factors that are independent of each other
    - passwords
    - SMS – out of band SMS text message
    - Turing test

# Authorization

- Authorization is the process of giving someone/something permission access a resource.
  - It occurs after identity has been validated
  - Verifies the rights to access resources, determined by business logic
  - Access Control List (ACL):
    - A table that tells the Operating System (OS) which access rights each user has to a particular system object.



# Compatible Time-Sharing System

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Computation Centre was among the first to develop a 'Compatible Time-Sharing System' (CTSS). CTSS operated from 1961 until 1973[1].
- MIT had developed an extensive CTSS (at that time) that allowed multiple researchers access to computation resources.
- However, they shared a mainframe as well as a single disk for data storages (files).







# Compatible Time-Sharing System

- Password mechanism used to share a mainframe
  - used to restrict access to specific files and allotted time slots.
  - Primarily used by University professors and researchers
  - In a time before mainstream Hacking.
- Due to the simplicity
  - passwords became the default method of computer security.

# Evolution of Password

- Passwords have gone beyond the original researchers:
  - Used by a wide range of individuals and systems to:
    - e-commerce (banking, shopping etc.)
    - Company information and systems
    - Critical infrastructure systems, Nuclear power station etc.
    - Emails accounts (AOL, Hotmail, Gmail etc.)
    - University - student information.




# Hacking in the 1980s

- Examples of real-life hackers
  - 1981- 'Chaos Computer Club' (Germany)
  - 1982- 'The 414s'
  - 1984- 'Legion of Doom', 'Cult of the Dead Cow'
  - etc.
  - etc.
  - 1994- Russian hackers stole \$10 millions from Citibank
  - etc.
  - 2014- Worldwide global cost of cybercrime is estimated at \$445 billion
  - 2018- Worldwide global cost of cybercrime is estimated at \$600 billion

# The 414s

*trendmania.co*



**HACKERS DE LOS 80s**


# Carbanak

- Carbanak
  - Dangerous combination of hackers and professional criminals
  - A criminal gang that carries out Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) that often targets financial institutions (2014).
  - Kaspersky lab believe them to be a Russian/UK Cyber Crime organisation
  - The criminal manipulate their access to respective networks to steal money:
    - Manipulated databases to orchestrate an attack
    - ATMs – instruct ATMs to dispense cash, with money mules collecting money depositing the money to the criminal accounts.


Carbanak creates file:

Family	File name	Size (bytes)	MD5
Trojan[Backdoor]/Win32.Carbanak	file.exe	404,992	a2643fe61f4b65704cfe1ebc55e2b301

# APT




# Carbanak Attack



Picture ref: <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/eight-charged-in-45-million-global-cyber-bank-thefts.html>

# Hackers to Attackers






# Internet a Perfect for Crime

- Today's Internet is:
  - Target rich environment
    - Banking eCommerce (Amazon, eBay, Insurance, etc.)
    - Media (Jobs, LinkedIn)
    - Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.)
    - The human element (victim)
  - Perfect place for crime
    - Anonymous access to vast resources
    - The availability of criminal tools
    - No national or political boundaries
    - Law enforcement is limited
    - Numerous opportunities for money laundering


# Breaches

- But how safe is it?
  - Recent breaches include:
    - BlueKai (2020, potentially 2b recorded left unprotected)
    - Capital One (2019, 100m details stolen)
    - British Airways (2019, 380K details stolen)
    - Marriot Hotels (2018, 500m details stolen)
- Cost – runs into Billions
  - Fix the breach and cover account monitoring for the victims
  - Actual losses credit (hackers monetising the crime)




# Protecting Passwords



Alice




Bob




xyz  
mypass

User Database			
id	userName	Email	password
1	Alice	alice@Hotmail	<b>xyz</b>
2	Bob	bob@gmail	<b>mypass</b>




# Protecting Passwords



User Database			
id	userName	Email	password
1	Alice	alice@Hotmail	<b>xyz</b>
2	Bob	bob@gmail	<b>mypass</b>

# Protecting Passwords



User Database			
id	userName	Email	password
1	Alice	alice@Hotmail	<b>xyz</b>
2	Bob	bob@gmail	<b>mypass</b>

- Wider impact:
  - Many users the same password for multiple accounts


# Password Reuse

- Stats

- 1% of passwords contain non-alphanumeric character
- 4% contain two character types
- 93% are 6 to 10 characters long

- A year after the Sony breach<sup>1</sup>:
  - *“59% of people were still using the exact same password on Yahoo! Voices.”*
  - A further 2% of passwords only differed by case.

Sony passwords reused at Yahoo! Voices




[1] <https://www.troyhunt.com/what-do-sony-and-yahoo-have-in-common/>




# Protecting Passwords

- Given the:
  - Numerous data breaches
  - User poor password habits
    - We create simple easy to remember passwords
    - We use the same password across multiple accounts
    - We are very slow about updating our passwords, even after a breach
- The bad guys know our weakness and target password
- We can secure passwords
  - Cryptology:
    - Hashing

# Protecting Passwords



Alice



Bob


Not acceptable

User Database			
id	userName	Email	password
1	Alice	alice@Hotmai	xyz
2	Bob	bob@gmail	mypass




# Hashing Algorithm

- Hashing algorithm is a complex mathematic function that transforms an input (string) in to a seemingly random sequence of numbers




- **Encryption:** is often seen as a way of temporarily storing data until it is needed and then is unencrypted
- **Hashing:** is One-way -> you do not unencrypt (or un-hash) the hashed data

# Protecting Passwords



# Hash Function

- A hash function compresses a set (information) to another set usually a shorter set.





Set A (Input Data)	Set B (Hash)
Philip	da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
Phi1ip	9ed7bcc82bc8cc78aa550908f37a532bf79112e5
Philip1	80647a60762f0671c400073af3ec8704888ca515
Philip3	4e1456cb612fa7eebaac4714668aa7209de183da

# Cryptographic Hash Function

- Hash property
  - What does hashing give us?
    - Hides the password
  - Hash functions are normally public knowledge
    - What if a hacker could determine the original password (message) from the hash (digest)?
- Properties:
  - Deterministic
  - Collision Resistance (CR)
    - Target Collision Resistance (TCR), weak collision resistance
  - Looks random
    - Non-Malleability
  - Public
    - Onewayness

# Cryptographic Hash Function


- Infeasible to reverse engineer  $x$ 
  - Algorithm is complex and difficult to reverse





Set A (Input Data)	Set B (Hash)
Philip	da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
Phi1ip	9ed7bcc82bc8cc78aa550908f37a532bf79112e5
Philip1	80647a60762f0671c400073af3ec8704888ca515
Philip3	4e1456cb612fa7eebaac4714668aa7209de183da

# Cryptographic Hash Function


- Properties:
  - Deterministic
  - Looks random
  - Public
    - Onewayness




# Password Storage



# Password Storage



**In theory the hash will be no good to the hacker?**






# Reverse Lookup Table

Hash value	Original password
5413ee24723bba2c5a6ba2d0196c78b3ee4628d1	myPassword
7af2d10b73ab7cd8f603937f7697cb5fe432c7ff	Admin123
cd027069371cdb4f80c68dcfb37e6f4a1bdb0222	User123
521f17fee5fc459d7458c18b5220fc10412bed1e	myPa55w0rd
7d018bb3df0e523692845af1f27e992ce8a41650	mySecret
f8ec29af355cd3fb52ddaf5767134061a8d3ea13	tooManyPasswords

These tables can contain 100s millions of entries

# Reverse Lookup Table

Hash value	Original password
5413ee24723bba2c5a6ba2d0196c78b3ee4628d1	myPassword
7af2d10b73ab7cd8f603937f7697cb5fe432c7ff	Admin123
cd027069371cdb4f80c68dcfb37e6f4a1bdb0222	User123
521f17fee5fc459d7458c18b5220fc10412bed1e	myPa55w0rd
<u>2345ac23443412341a23232323232323232323</u>	<u>mySecretpassWord</u>
f8ec29af355cd3fb52ddaf5767134061a8d3ea13	tooManyPasswords



# Reverse Lookup Tables

HashKillerHash Cracker ▾List Manager ▾Tools ▾Downloads ▾Hashcat GUIDiscordForums

### What is HashKiller?

HashKiller's purpose is to serve as a meeting place for computer hobbyists, security researchers and penetration testers. It serves as a central location to promote greater security on the internet by demonstrating the weakness of using weak hash based storage / authentication.

HashKiller.co.uk is a hash lookup service. This allows you to input a hash and search for its corresponding plaintext ("found") in our database of already-cracked hashes.

In other words, we are not cracking your hash in realtime - we're just caching the hard work of many cracking enthusiasts over the years.

### Need a hash cracking?

[Crack Some Hashes](#)

Note that we do **not** use terms like "decrypted", "dehashed", or "reversed" - hashes can only be looked up quickly *after they've been cracked the hard way.*

### Last 50 successful hash cracks / finds

#	Hash Type	Hash / Salt	Password	Cracked By	Date
1	SHA1	4097a6f4b6e1ed76b845adec3fe5a9ae4622c5a9	dandym123	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:53
2	SHA1	718e7140aee18c330c5d176eb0239e398ae120fd	thiagow40	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:52
3	SHA1	5ff18ddde7532a718f0170cc683acd6630734fc8	clau0800	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:51
4	SHA1	bbf5c8eaa2bf0fcacd30a392ff4154c3d50162bb	pit32216814	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:50
5	SHA1	89846e225e2443cc9dd4a2bfaaaa902409298942	83658367	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:49
6	SHA1	6ef7007fb736fbc651112f1c07fdb54a5d15ea2	gregory157946821365	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:48
7	MD5	c63271d6b2f678cb09e84c092971077b	kozchulebg	vetronexe	15-Aug-2019 13:52:48
8	SHA1	2af134e1da00d35b914ba3c56fd513145fe9c476	220215du	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:47
9	SHA1	c65ee92e4edac04fbec3db1037c31c69c906bb96	bertinbertin123	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:46
10	SHA1	2af134e1da00d35b914ba3c56fd513145fe9c476	220215du	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:45
11	SHA1	55896d28cb472e6f6b1ee8cf7eb466928527ed1a	11121314mae	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:44
12	SHA1	fde8d8009eb9209f0db54807c876751924fa13d2	ekinho3		15-Aug-2019 13:52:43
13	SHA1	55896d28cb472e6f6b1ee8cf7eb466928527ed1a	11121314mae	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:41
14	SHA1	18ef4866c50f105b7ab0a24dd8edf3cc693c0824	pedroolavo1	gearjunkie	15-Aug-2019 13:52:40
15	MySQL4.1/MySQL5	d696d2ea474c98f6ade698f07cf9df18e0c987a4	karakara23	cvsi	15-Aug-2019 13:52:39
16	SHA1	e1bdfa8db292acc85552625b7bfc00315c1cf6f4	42754275	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:39
17	SHA1	44e362957b565d8992246c390c10195df099e2ec	testoland	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:38
18	SHA1	086fc153ac2a532a8246f6dbfac8a7781fc59556	gwn8cdty	blandyuk	15-Aug-2019 13:52:37
19	SHA1	e9883145dce8b41d02bcd49c39f520b89c8acaae	102769		15-Aug-2019 13:52:36

# Reverse Lookup Tables

The screenshot displays the HashKiller web application interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the following items: HashKiller, Hash Cracker (with a dropdown arrow), List Manager (with a dropdown arrow), Tools (with a dropdown arrow), Downloads (with a dropdown arrow), Hashcat GUI, Discord, and Forums (with a dropdown arrow).

Below the navigation bar, a grey header bar contains the text: "Please list your hashes below ...".

The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column contains the following text:

Please input the hash hashes that you would like to look up. NOTE that the space character is replaced with `[space]`.

Your Hashes:

```
7c91ec228f38e3cdd81f782765bb6b124850bc7f
```

Below the input field is a green button labeled "Crack my Hashes". Underneath the button, there is a note: "Upload button disabled? We use Google reCAPTCHA v3."

The right column contains the following text:

HashKiller.co.uk is a hash lookup service. This allows you to input an hash hash and search for its corresponding plaintext ("found") in our database of already-cracked hashes.

It's like having your own massive password-cracking cluster - but with immediate results!

We have been building our hash database since August 2007.

Note that we do **not** use terms like "decrypted", "dehashed", or "reversed" - hashes can only be looked up quickly *after they've been cracked the hard way*.

In other words, we are not cracking your hash in realtime - we're just caching the hard work of many cracking enthusiasts over the years.

Output Formats :

- Found : `$hash[:$salt] $type $pass`
- Not Found : `$hash[:$salt] [No Match]`
- Invalid : `$hash [Invalid]`

Below the right column, there is a section titled "Cracker Results:" containing the following output:

```
7c91ec228f38e3cdd81f782765bb6b124850bc7f SHA1 myPa55word
```

# Attackers

- Dictionary attack
  - List for words and word-pattern: Example: password, pas55w0rd etc.
- Brute force attack
  - Try everything, Fuzz the pattern
- Reverse Lookup tables attack
- Social Engineering/Phishing
- Malware (key loggers, memory scrappers)
- Offline cracking
- Spidering

# Human Behaviour

- Humans:
  - Use the same password for multiple accounts
  - Use simple easy to remember passwords
  - Fail to update the passwords
- Password resets:
  - Leak information on social media
  - Link accounts with each other
  - Poor security questions

# Password strength

- Password strength checker<sup>1</sup>

The screenshot shows a password strength checker interface with three examples. Each example includes a password input field, a strength indicator bar, and a link to learn more about creating strong passwords.

**Example 1:** Password: [\*\*\*\*\*] (6 characters). Strength: Weak (red bar).

**Example 2:** Password: [\*\*\*\*\*] (6 characters). Strength: Medium (yellow bar).

**Example 3:** Password: [\*\*\*\*\*] (10 characters). Strength: Strong (green bar).

Weak password pattern	Is it memorable?	Time to crack
A common word (example: december)	Yes	18 milliseconds
An easily-typed spatial word (example: qwerty)	Yes	10 milliseconds
The family dog (example: rex)	Yes	27 milliseconds
An important number, such as DOB, Wedding (example: 03261981)	Memorable to the user	2.213 seconds
A word with trivial letter→number substitutions (example: pa55w0rd)	Sort of memorable, but you may forget which letters are substituted for numbers.	639 milliseconds

[1] <http://designinginterfaces.com/patterns/password-strength-meter/>

# Password Compromise

- Data breach
  - System vulnerabilities
  - “According to Verizon, 81% of all data breaches take advantage of stolen or weak passwords.”
- Weak passwords
  - Attackers target our behaviour
- Poor software design/implementation
- Password reset methods
  - Security questions, humans leak information
- Malware
  - Keyloggers, especially if you use public computers



Weak	Still easy to crack	A little better
BankLogin	BankLogin13	BankLogin!3

- Passphrase
- Use randomly chosen words - four

Weak password pattern	Is it memorable?	Time to crack
Four + random words	To you	Years ++

Weak password pattern	Is it memorable?	Time to crack
A common word (example: december)	Yes	18 milliseconds
An easily-typed spatial word (example: qwerty)	Yes	10 milliseconds
The family dog (example: rex)	Yes	27 milliseconds
An important number, such as DOB, Wedding (example: 03261981)	Memorable to the user	2.213 seconds
A word with trivial letter→number substitutions (example: pa55w0rd)	Sort of memorable, but you may forget which letters are substituted for numbers.	639 milliseconds

# Principles of software security Architecture

- 1) Economy of Mechanism
- 2) Fail-safe defaults (permission based access control)
- 3) Complete Mediation (check permission before access to objects)
- 4) Open design (design should not be secret)
- 5) Separation of Privilege (Multiple conditions required to complete task)
- 6) Least Privilege (minimum rights)
- 7) Least Common Mechanism (minimize shared subsystems/roles)
- 8) Psychological acceptability (usability)
- 9) Defence in Depth

# Psychological acceptability (usability)

Hit any key to continue



Ref: <a href="https://clipartxtras.com/">clipartxtras.com</a>